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The  logic  of  the  ‘as  if’  and  the  (non)existence of God: An inquiry into the nature of belief in the
work of Jacques Derrida
Colby Dickinson, KU Leuven

Abstract
The religious thematics at play in the work of Jacques Derrida have often provided an ongoing
platform from which to struggle with the entire scope of his work, thus moving the seemingly
peripheral discourses on religion within his oeuvre to the center stage. Despite repeated attempts
to come to terms both theologically and philosophically with the conditional nature of
representations, the problematics of representation are perhaps nowhere more forcefully
demonstrated  than  in  the  work  of  Derrida.    Indeed,  for  Derrida,  the  ‘as  if’,  as  a  regulative  
principle directly appropriated and modified from its Kantian context, becomes the central
lynchpin  for  understanding,  not  only  Derrida’s  philosophical  system  as  a  whole,  but  also  his  
numerous  seemingly  enigmatic  references  to  his  ‘jewishness’, as I intend to demonstrate in what
follows. Through an analysis  of  the  function  of  the  ‘as  if’  within  the  history  of  thought,  from  
Greek tragedy to the poetry of Wallace Stevens, I hope to show how Derrida can only appropriate
his  Judaic  roots  as  an  act  of  mourning  that  seeks  to  render  the  lost  object  as  present,  ‘as  if’  it  were  
incorporated by the subject for whom this act nevertheless remains an impossibility. As Derrida
discerns within the poetry of Paul Celan, bringing a sense of presence/presentness to our
experiences, and as a confirmation of the subject which the human being struggles to assert, is
the poetic task par excellence. It is seemingly also, if Derrida is to be understood on this point,
the only option left to a humanity wherein poetry comes to express what religious formulations
can no longer justify.
Keywords:  ‘as  if’,  representation,  poetry,  Judaism,  mourning

Introduction: Representing images in Greek thought
As if, as if, as if the disparate halves
Of things were waiting in a betrothal known
To  none…
…the burning
And breeding and bearing birth of harmony,
The final relation, the marriage of the rest. (Stevens 1997, 396)
Dwelling on the image, the very essence and form of representation, the American poet
Wallace Stevens here contemplates the harmony long sought after as a completion of images.
They are images which cannot fade because they are all we have to work with, as he states earlier
in  the  poem;;  they  indeed  ‘can  be  no  more  faded  than  ourselves’.    Yet  they  can  of course be false,
a  ‘stale’  desire  that  strives  toward  a  harmony  seemingly forever suspended by the thrice repeated
conditional  nature  of  the  ‘as  if’  which  accompanies  it in this poem. Following the stories of
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Greek mythology, as Stevens here does, it is the marriage of Mars and Venus that brings about
the birth of Harmonia (in Greek) or Concord (in Latin), a marital unity which he invokes directly
in  his  two  part  poem  ‘Study  of  Images’.    And this is a title which alone seems to convey the
significance of the subject that Stevens is attempting to circumscribe. In this fashion, the
perpetual oppositions between war and love, sun and moon, male and female, as between Mars
and Venus, are brought to a harmonious concord, we might say, one that in fact indicates, for
Stevens, the tensions present within the realm of representations or images as a whole. If
understood this way, we live always poised to realize a unity that never seems to come, that is
truly,  as  Stevens  suggests,  ‘known  to  none’.    It  is  always  ‘as  if,  as  if,  as  if’  it  were  about  to  
happen, though it never does. And,  as  Stevens’  poem  seeks  to  demonstrate,  this  is  perhaps the
great  truth  which  undergirds  humanity’s  quest  for  constructing  images,  something  deeply  sought
after in the poetic endeavor to  present  things  as  they  are  (‘as  such’),  though  it  is  more  likely to be
achievable, we might say, in the  conditional  nature  of  the  ‘as  if’. The relationship between these
two  seemingly  conflicting  poles  (the  ‘as  such’  and  the  ‘as  if’)  will  in  fact  come  to  generate  the  
entirety of what we might call the ‘hermeneutical field of representations’.
For its part, Greek mythology, as is typically the case, manages to give symbolic,
narrative form to the underlying truths of our need for constructing images or representations. If
we follow this genealogy further, of course, we are led to the fact that Harmonia, the daughter of
Mars and Venus, later married Cadmus, the legendary founder of Thebes and the figure whom
Herodotus credited as having brought the alphabet to Greece. Their union in turn produced a
child, Semele, the eventual mother (along with Zeus) of the young god Dionysus. This, at least,
is the version of events which Euripides relates in his play The Bacchae, a drama centered on the
arrival of this new god into the Greek pantheon of deities.
In the course of time, however, the play also comes to center upon King Pentheus,
grandson of Cadmus by another daughter. He is, in his essential role within the play, a king who
emphatically denies the existence of the young god and forbids any worship of him, considering
him  to  be  ‘outside’  the  laws  of  the  city  of  Thebes. It is, in fact, this series of events, the
presentation of a new deity alongside his denial by the ruling sovereign, that is not far removed
from the suspended (conditional) nature of harmony which Stevens invokes above. Rather, the
‘as  if’,  we  might  say,  comes  to  dominate  Euripides’  all-too-brief meditations on the nature of
belief as well, something which comes to a head in a scene that highlights the aporias of
representation  (of  dwelling  ‘within  its laws’)  as they are present within the very nature of belief.
In this particular scene, Cadmus, the father of Semele and the husband of Harmonia,
speaks to Pentheus, and attempts to convince him of the apparent necessity for believing
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Dionysus to be a god. Indeed, the inclusion of a deity into the familial clan would bring great
honor to the family and could perhaps even serve to eradicate the social shame they have already
incurred. What is of great interest here is the manner in which belief, in a very literal sense, is
linked by Cadmus to a state of dwelling within the laws, or nomoi, of communal life, whether
they be societal or familial. This is so despite the fact that the worship of Dionysus is currently
considered outside the laws or prescribed norms of the city. As Euripides renders the lines:
My son, Tiresias exhorted you well;
dwell  with  us,  not  outside  [or  ‘in  the  wilderness  beyond’]  the  accustomed  ways  [nomoi,
laws].
For at present your mind has taken wing, and your thought is no thought.
Even if this is no god, as you assert,
let him be called one by you—tell  a  lie  in  good  cause  [or  ‘declare  well  and  falsely’],
that  he  is  Semele’s  child,  so  that  it  may  seem  that  she  bore  a  god
and we gain honour for all our family. (Euripides 1979, 53–4)1
Semele was the mother of Dionysus by Zeus, as I have already stated, a fact which no one
believed and was the source of her dishonor shortly before her sudden death brought on by
viewing  the  radiant  fullness  of  her  lover’s  being.    Pentheus,  however,  is  here advised by Cadmus,
her father, to accept the god as if he were real, false though this act may be, something which
even Cadmus acknowledges to be the case. This is yet an act, we are told, that would render him
capable of dwelling with, and within, the laws of the family. It would be a disingenuous act, to be
sure, but all semblance of belief would be maintained and the social standing of the family may in
fact increase. Real belief, Cadmus seems to be saying, comes second (if at all) to its cultural
representation.
It is intriguing then that law (nomoi) should figure  so  prominently  in  Euripides’  play,  at  
least  insofar  as  Dionysus  is  deemed  to  be  ‘outside’  the  laws  of  the  polis,  just  as  his  female  
worshippers leapt and danced themselves into a divine frenzy upon the outskirts of the city. In
this  light,  Cadmus’  exhortation  made  to  Pentheus  to  return  within  the  laws  (of  the  clan  or  family)  
takes  on  a  new  meaning,  as  the  laws  of  belief  in  this  deity  are  outside  the  ‘laws’  of  the  polis  yet  
they do adhere to  an  apparent  ‘rule’  or  ‘norm’ of another community. As Charles Segal (1982,
286) has hinted, perhaps the conflict of laws here is rather indicative of another tension, one of
symbolic meaning in general. Seen this way, the conflict of symbols that Euripides confronts, in
fact, cannot be entirely held together and causes him to seek new forms of language that attempt
to  go  beyond  the  familiar  structures  of  language’s  everyday  usage.    The  play  thus  confronts  the  
warring poles of the rational (logos) and the irrational (mythos) for which there was no apparent
mediation (272–3).    In  this  sense,  Euripides’  tragedy,  like  all  tragic  art,  holds  these  irresolvable  
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tensions between, what Segal calls, the ‘centrifugal’ and ‘centripetal’ forces it contains, those
forces that tend toward chaos and those that tend toward order (340). Hence, tragedy, as the work
of art which brings order to our chaotic world, is capable of shaping nature into an intelligible
form, but also, it would seem, of shaping our belief in these systems of order that circulate as so
many laws in our world.
In short, what Euripides confronts us with in the course of this highly revealing scene is
the essential dilemma of faith now given representation, one which has not become less
problematic with time. The sought-after images in which we seek to identify ourselves and, in
turn, by which we are identified, whatever their social nature, must seemingly be upheld as the
very basis for cultural intelligibility, no matter the falsity of their nature.    Or  so  Cadmus’  position  
would have us believe. Some, therefore, like Cadmus who had joined himself to Harmonia, are
given over to belief in what may indeed be false so that appearances (equated by Euripides with
law, nomoi) which give order (harmony, concord) to society might be maintained. That is, he
attempts to  make  an  effort  to  dwell  in  semblances  ‘as  if’  they  were  genuine  so  that  the  traditional  
structures of representation might hold. The conditions of intelligibility, it might be said, depend
upon such an accord being struck. Some, like Pentheus, however, refuse to cooperate with this
patently  falsified  scheme,  becoming  in  fact  the  ‘unbelievers’  who  threaten  to  thwart  the  workings  
of the system and are seemingly destroyed by their unwillingness to engage in these fabricated
images. In many ways, this is perhaps an expression of the preference to live under another law
(the  polis’  law)  and  the  clash  of  representations  and  cultures  that  we  so  often  encounter  in  our  
world. (Pentheus, in fact at play’s  end,  is  torn  limb  from  limb  by  the  frenzied  female  worshippers  
of  Dionysus.    A  tragic  ending  for  one  who  was  not  able  to  ‘see’  the  necessity  of  believing  in  a  
deity  he  could  not  be  certain  of.)    And  yet  others,  like  Cadmus’  daughter  Semele,  yearn  to  
glimpse what lies beyond representation entirely, or that which cannot be fully absorbed by a
finite creature, to view the absolute overwhelming pureness of an exposed divinity and so perish
in full view of what cannot ever be expressed by human beings.
There is genuinely little that has been subsequently added to this lengthiest tale of how
history has attempted to grapple with representation. It is only a struggle perhaps best expressed
through the conditionality  of  the  ‘as  if’  which  both  Stevens  and  Euripides place right before our
eyes. In this fashion, it can be seen as a regulative principle that seems to hold a fundamental
place in describing the (often unexpressed, or unknown) hopes pinned upon our construction and
use of images. It is also, as the history of thought has already witnessed, the lynchpin of belief
itself, perhaps best embodied in the problematic surrounding the origin and lineage of a
conjecture on belief like Pascal’s  wager.    For Pascal, we would do well to recall, the wager to be
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made  upon  God’s  existence  was, in essence, a bid to create belief simply by weighing the merits
of believing in the divine, and then pronouncing this belief as a quasi-certitude grounded upon the
conditional  ‘as  if’:  as  if  simply  believing  ‘as  if’  there  were a god were enough to guarantee some
sort of validity to the claim (Pascal 2008, 152–8). What Pascal repeats, of course without saying
so  much,  is  Cadmus’  attempt  to  stay  within  the  nomoi of traditional representational limitations.
In this light, then, Pascal’s  wager  might  perhaps  be  more  convincingly  portrayed  as  itself  simply  
providing verification that there is a crack within the representational logics at work in our world.
These are logics, likewise, which even Cadmus would admit are futile in their certain
pronouncement that a god (must or should) exist, though they are logics which have traditionally
been filled with the presumed existence of the divine.
Here, we thus enter into the varied historical musings of an otherwise over-labored ontotheology. Traditional proofs  for  God’s  existence,  from  this  viewpoint,  could  thus  be  seen  as  little  
more than attempts to resolve the unresolvable aporias present in human experience. In other
words, what Pascal seems to be doing is little more than to suggest the  absolute  necessity  for  ‘as  
if’  statements  themselves,  truly  in  fact  saying  nothing  about  the  existence  or  non-existence of an
actual divine being. What this analysis points to, instead of guaranteeing the existence of God, is
that a fundamental (mis)reading  of  the  nature  of  the  ‘as  if’  has  dominated  over  the  history  of  
onto-theological speculation, from the earliest Greek mythologies to the present day. The
essential  nature  of  the  ‘as  if’, I would assert, rather remains a major unresolved problematic with
which neither philosophy nor theology has adequately dealt. In what follows, I hope to
demonstrate,  however,  that  a  particular  Kantian  appropriation  of  the  ‘as  if’  (als ob), as developed
in the work of Jacques Derrida, may in fact hold a key to a contemporary understanding of the
necessity of the conditional, formulated in his work most directly as the desire for the poetic ‘as  
such’  over and beyond, though in some sense dependent upon, the religious ‘as  if’.
The  philosophical  nature  of  the  ‘as  if’
It would be quite problematic to distinguish the conjectural claims for a divine existence
made  by  both  Euripides  and  Pascal  from  Kant’s  positing  of  the  existence  of  God  as  based  upon  a  
similar  ‘as  if’  model  of  thought.    In  what  has  become  the  historical centerpiece of philosophical
reflections  upon  the  nature  of  the  ‘as  if’,  Kant’s  claim  that  God’s  existence  must  be  assumed  as  
‘morally  necessary’  has  come  to  dominate  subsequent  thoughts  upon  the  nature  of  belief  itself.    In  
his  second  Critique,  God’s  existence  is  something  we  must  ‘assume’,  Kant  tells  us,  as  it  can  only  
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be  based  on  the  ‘possibility’  of  the  highest  good  being  transformed  into  a  reality (Kant 1996,
241). And, as he states elsewhere,
One cannot provide objective reality for any theoretical idea, or prove it, except for the
idea of freedom, because this is the condition of the moral law, whose reality is an axiom.
The reality of the idea of God can only be proved by means of this idea, and hence only
with a practical purpose, i.e., to act as though (als ob,  ‘as  if’) there is a God, and hence
only for this purpose. (Kant 2004, 590–1)
In  terms  of  the  Kantian  ‘regulative  principle’  (in  relation,  he  stresses,  to  ‘all  cosmological  ideas’),  
which is most fully developed in the first Critique, there  is  ‘no  experience  of  an  absolute  
boundary’  in  empirical  terms  when  one  considers  cosmological  questions.    Hence,  there  is  ‘no  
experience  of  a  condition  as  one  that  is  absolutely  unconditioned  empirically’ (Kant 1997, 525).
The conditional is all that truly remains, a fact to which later interpreters, such as Derrida (as we
shall see), cling fast. This logic, in fact, would encompass the existence of God as well, an idea
which could never be validated as a concrete, empirical reality according to him. The
unconditional is therefore all that can finally be asserted as indicative of an otherwise inevitable
‘regress  to  infinity’  that  Kant  discerns  at  work  in  our  general  schemes  of  representation.    
In  his  section  of  the  second  Critique  ‘On  the  final  aim  of the natural dialectic of human
reason’,  Kant  resolutely  maneuvers  his  analysis  of  the  problematic  of  universals  and  the  nature  of  
representation  as  a  whole  under  the  auspices  of  the  ‘as  if’  (als ob).    It  is  the  ‘as  if’  indeed  which  
allows reason to comprehend  ‘the  possibility  of  things  in  the  world  of  sense’ (609). In so many
words,  everything  in  Kant’s  discernment  of  universals  seems  to  lie  within  the  realm  of  the  ‘as  if’  
(als ob), which  makes  Kant’s  ethics,  as  well  as  any  positing  of  the  existence  of  God, sustainable.
In the end, some form of deism is all that philosophy could potentially justify, though even this
claim is ultimately without any empirical verification (608).    Like  Pascal,  Kant’s  determination  of  
God’s  existence  seems  rather  to  point  toward the fractured nature of representation itself,
something which will continue to haunt any ‘proofs’  to  be  given for  God’s  existence.
Despite any subsequent neo-Kantian  attempts  to  develop  an  ethics  of  the  ‘as  if’  upon  
these most basic principles (Vaihinger 1965), his ethics is ultimately founded upon a conjecture, to
act  ‘as  if’  there  were  a  God,  which  is,  for  some,  perhaps  to  do  away  with  God  practically  
speaking. Such a position is perhaps lurking in what Richard Kearney has lately attempted to
provide through his distinguishing between the function of  the  analogical  ‘as’  and  the  fictive  ‘as  
if’.    Narrative  wagers,  the stuff of religious scripture, according to Kearney, are more about
‘imagination  and  hospitality’  than  about  ‘calculation  and  blind  leaps’.    Specifically  in  contrast  to  
Pascal’s  wager,  he  tells  us,  ‘they  solicit  fidelity  not  fideism’ (Kearney 2010, xvii). He goes on
indeed  to  state  that  the  ‘as  if’  can  only  ever  be  a  fictive  proposition,  whereas  the  ‘as’  itself  is  an  
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analogical attempt to  state  truth  (e.g.  ‘the  stranger  as divine’) (15). For him, then, a belief that he
calls  ‘anatheism’  is  about  a  forward  looking  repetition, and, in this gesture, a return to the divine
through  the  analogical  ‘as’. The  stranger,  if  taken  ‘as’ divine, would allow a concrete presence to
unfold  before  us,  whereas  the  fictive  ‘as  if’  suspends  our  belief  entirely,  never  really  to  return.    It
is  the  alliance  between  atheism  and  theism  that  signals  a  sort  of  ‘post-theism’ for Kearney, a
belief  in  a  God  who  ‘may  be’ (80, 180; Kearney 2001). He faults contemporary poststructuralists such  as  Derrida  (whose  own  take  on  the  ‘as  if’  will  be  taken  up  shortly),  in  fact,  for  
not  returning  to  any  (narrated)  sense  of  divinity  (a  ‘named  God’)  in  their  writings,  leaving  faith
ultimately suspended and without resolution, without a concrete force appearing before us
(Kearney 2010, 65).2 In essence, lacking the finesse of an anatheistic (hermeneutic) response
which he intends to further draw out.
Kearney’s  critique  would  seem, in so many words, to be aimed directly at those Kantian
reductions of narrative identities which would efface any particularity of the divine in favor of a
generalized  (vague)  deism,  or  even  atheism.    Despite  his  criticisms,  however,  Kearney’s  
objections seem to struggle to make a definitive distinction between a Pascalian wager in a God
who might or might not exist  and  Kearney’s  emphasis  upon  a  God  ‘who  may  be’, perhaps in the
end (and for the same reasons that we will see  at  work  in  Derrida’s  thought) because there is a
fundamental indeterminacy at play in any determination, one that unlocks our (theo)poetic
imaginative, and narrative, landscape. This is to say that despite our ability to treat the stranger as
divine, this gesture of hospitality says nothing about the (non)existence of the divine, only the
nature of our hospitable act. To develop a representation of God, or of any-thing,  the  ‘as  if’  will  
in some sense still have to be utilized, even if we wish to treat one thing potentially as another.
Indeed, to treat even a stranger as divine,  we  would  first  have  to  utilize  something  like  the  ‘as  if’  
(as a regulative principle) to formulate what our notion of divinity would be in the first place. In
this  sense,  Kant’s  influence  continues  to  move  through the history of philosophical reflection
upon the nature of universals and the regulative principles of thought despite  Kearney’s  possible  
objections.    The  ‘as  if’  in  fact,  has  not  gone  away,  despite  what  Kearney  and  others  might  hope,  
but has actually become solidified as the paradoxical (aporetic) essence of what constitutes any
representational identity, and, in essence, of what constitutes any attempt to formulate belief.
The influence of Kant upon Derrida’s work, for example, has continued to outline such a
reading (Rothfield).    This  should  come  as  little  surprise  to  Derrida’s  close  readers,  though  it  does  
seem to provide an immediate clash of sorts as the great systematic regulator of thought is aligned
with  the  ‘father  of  deconstructionism’.    It is hardly a profound observation, however, that
Derrida’s  writing  was  dependent  upon  the  strategic  usage  of  conditional  (‘if’  or  ‘as  if’)  
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statements,  something  which  lay  at  the  foundations  of  all  Kant’s  systematic  reflections,  as  we  
have just seen. This is  so  because  Derrida’s  rhetoric  was  itself  dependent  upon  a  state  of    
undecidability that ran as a current throughout his entire oeuvre.3 Though this is not to suggest
that Derrida and Kant overlap entirely on their use of conditional statements. In general, I find
Hager  Weslaty’s  analysis  of  the  ‘as  if’  to  be  quite accurate:  Derrida’s  use  of  the  ‘as  if’  is  a  force  
of  dissemination  and  expansion  (‘an  essential  component  of  “différance”’),    in  contrast  to  Kant’s  
usage, which, for its part, was an attempt to provide a foundation for metaphyiscs and to bridge
the gaps within experience (Weslaty 2002, 43-4). Despite  this  nuance,  however,  Derrida’s  use  of  
the  ‘as  if’  does  essentially  conform  to  the  Kantian  notion  of  its  being  a  ‘regulative  idea’,  as  a  
preservation of the necessity for representation  itself  (‘there is nothing  outside  the  text’).    This  is  
perhaps  also  why,  in  so  many  words,  Derrida’s  comments  on  experience  are  seemingly  so  often  
removed from being indebted to particular, concrete traditions, heritages, canons or religions.4 It
is the universal structure of experience, once so important to Kant, that Derrida must engage if
representations,  themselves  posited  as  intelligible  only  through  the  use  of  the  ‘as  if’,  are  to  
continue to have any meaning.
In  a  short  article  on  ‘rogue  states’  (Derrida 2004a) that later became part of his book
Rogues (Derrida 2004b),  for  example,  Derrida  unfolds  his  indebtedness  to  the  Kantian  ‘regulative  
idea’  which  is  mired  in  the  use of the ‘as  if’.    In  this  fashion,  the ‘decisive  and  enigmatic  role  
played by the als ob in  all  of  Kant's  thought’  comes  back  to  Derrida  as  a  central  principle  within  
his own work. As he there suggests,
…if  we  come  back  this  time  to  the  strict  meaning  Kant  gave  to  the  regulative use of ideas
(as opposed to their constitutive use), we would, in all rigor, and in order to say anything
on this subject, and especially in order to appropriate such terms, have to subscribe to the
entire Kantian architectonic and critique, something I cannot seriously undertake or even
commit myself to doing here. We would have to begin by asking about what Kant calls
“the  different  interest  in  reason”  (ein verschiedenes Interesse der Vernunft), the
imaginary (the focus imaginarius, that point toward which all the lines directing the rules
of understanding—which is not reason—tend and converge and thus indefinitely
approximate), the necessary illusion, which need not necessarily deceive us, the figure of
an approach or approximation (zu nähern) that tends indefinitely toward rules of
universality, and especially the indispensable use of the as if (als ob)….  We  cannot  treat  
this here, but I thought it necessary at least to note, in principle, how circumspect I would
be  to  appropriate  in  any  rigorous  way  this  idea  of  a  “regulative  Idea.” (Derrida 2004a,
330)
Here,  the  problematic  nature  of  the  ‘as  if’  within  all  representational  logics  is  perhaps  best  
understood as essentially bound to the tendencies toward universalization, part and parcel of the
‘imaginary’,  the  ‘necessary  illusion,  which  need  not  necessarily  deceive  us’.    Though  this  is  a  
very  limited  taking  up  of  the  conditional  thematic  within  Kant’s  work,  Derrida  is  far  from  
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finished  with  his  confrontation  with  the  ‘as  if’.    Indeed,  as  I  will  would  like  now  to  show, the  ‘as  
if’  almost  becomes  the principle by which to grasp his reflections upon representation, reason,
metaphysics and belief, not to mention the intriguing and often enigmatic suggestions he made
over the years concerning his relationship to historical religious traditions, especially his Judaic
heritage.
What  I  hope  to  demonstrate,  in  what  follows,  is  that  Derrida’s  dealings  with  the  ‘as  if’  are  
firmly entrenched within its historical disclosure as a principle indiscociable from all attempts at
forming culturally intelligible representations. Hence, a  ‘necessary  illusion’  appears  as  the  
revealed structure of representation, something Derrida must speak of openly so as not to deceive
us, so as not to do violence to us through any hidden, or obscured (ontotheological) illusions. His
characterizations of justice and responsibility that run as a single thread throughout much of his
later work would  seem  to  dictate  nothing  less  than  this  willingness.    These  are  ‘necessary  
illusions’  that  are  essential  to  all  acts  of  representation  and  that  are  rendered  ‘less  violent’  through  
their more or less being exposed as the illusions they are, hence as not necessarily deceptive; they
are,  as  Derrida  seems  to  indicate  above,  only  an  ‘approximation’.    Yet,  they  are  also what
Cadmus once asked Pentheus to declare his loyalty to, though falsely, so that the laws (nomoi) of
society might be further upheld. They are, in this manner, completely to be opened to their
subsequent deconstruction.
It is this tension of living within  a  ‘necessary  illusion’  which  does  ‘not  necessarily  
deceive  us’  that  in  fact  generates  a  conception  of  history  for  Derrida,  as  well  as  those  religious,  
philosophical markers of our traditional identities, something he posits as ranging all the way
back to Platonism and its subsequent reliance upon the representative image. And if this lineage
between  ‘us  moderns’  and  the  Judaic  and  Greek  takes  on  representation  seems  somewhat
arbitrary, it is nonetheless fundamental for Derrida:  ‘Are  we  Jews?    Are  we Greeks? We live in
the difference between the Jew and the Greek, which is perhaps the unity of what is called
history’ (Derrida 1978, 153).5 Taking our point of departure in Greek thought, then, is no
coincidental or arbitrary starting point, for such is his pronouncement in an essay devoted to
underscoring the nature of how violence and metaphysics interact. His concluding reference to
the  Joycean  ‘jewgreek’  or  ‘greekjew’  that  identifies  all  of  us  would  only  seem  to  further  cement
the impossibility of ever fully appropriating any particular, historical religious identification,
rather always being caught in a suspension between the tensions of representation, much as
Euripides had tried to illustrate through his pushing of language to its boundaries.6 It is not a
stretch, then, to see how these formulations, as we will see in a moment, in fact lead him to
identify  the  regulative  structure  of  the  ‘as  if’  with  the  ‘relation  without  relation’  that  is  
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characteristic of his universalizations (Derrida 1999b);;  how  indeed  a  ‘religion  without  religion’  
could be said to spring from this conditional site.
What  remains  of  Derrida’s  faith
Derrida’s  relationship  to  religious  thought  has  frequently  been  opened  to  multiple  
(mis)readings, from Judaic (Bergo 2007; Ofrat 2001), to Christian (Shakespeare 2009; Hart 1989) to
atheistic (Hägglund 2008). To give but one recent example of how problematic this discourse on
Derrida’s  religious  (non)affiliations  has  been,  we  would  do  well  to  note  how  Leonard  Lawlor,  in  
a series of  lectures  devoted  to  Derrida’s  work  on  animality,  struggled  with  identifying  Derrida’s  
religious  strands  of  thought.    For  Lawlor,  it  is  Derrida’s  insistence  upon  a  ‘weak  force’  moving  
through  history  that  is  ‘one  of  the  voices  of  Christianity’  that  influences his work. Yet Derrida
also, Lawlor tells us, attempts to point beyond Christianity, through a deconstruction of
Christianity, to a space prior to Christianity and, therefore, he is not to be considered a Christian
(Lawlor 2007, 112–3). The paradoxical  logic  of  ‘belonging  without  belonging’  that  Derrida  
famously appropriated from the work of Levinas and that came to dominate his later thoughts on
concrete,  historical  institutions,  is  on  full  display  once  again  in  Lawlor’s  formulations,  though  this  
time in relation specifically to Christianity.
As I have already been suggesting throughout, what we are in truth dealing with in
Derrida’s  conceptualization  of  religious  identity  is  the  nature  of  representation  itself,  the  manner  
in which any person could be said to identify with any particular religious heritage. This is, at
once,  an  expansion  of  the  Kantian  ‘regulative  idea’  best  exemplified  in  the  workings  of  the  ‘as  if’,  
though it is also a restriction of its operations, a movement away from utilizing the conditional as
a  ‘filler  of  the  (metaphysical)  gaps’  (thus  being  utilized  to  posit  God’s  existence, for example)
and toward its being embraced as the ‘condition  without  condition’ that grounds every reflective
operation. Religion, in this sense, seems only  at  times  to  be  an  emblematic  figure  within  Derrida’s  
work on the historical repetition of identities and their struggle to become fully articulate,
something mirrored in other canonical forms (i.e. ideological, national, ethnic-racial, etc), though
not as forcefully asserted historically.
The  structure  of  the  ‘as  if’  in  relation  to  one’s  (always  personal)  experience,  central  as  it  
was to the Kantian project, opportunely reappears here, however, as essential, or as foundational
even, within the context of  Derrida’s  discussion  of  his  relation  to  Judaism.    This  fact  is  not  
something that can be lightly glossed over; indeed, it figures as the determining factor behind his
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religious formulations on the whole. In what may be the lengthiest single, and yet most decisive
sentence of his essay  on  ‘Abraham,  the  Other’,  he  states:
I introduce myself both as the least Jewish, the most unworthy Jew, the last to deserve the
title of authentic Jew, and at the same time, because of all this, by reason of a force of
rupture that uproots and universalizes the place, the local, the familial, the communal, the
national, and so on, he who plays at playing the role of the most Jewish of all, the last and
therefore the only survivor fated to assume the legacy of generations, to save the response
or responsibility before the assignation, or before the election, always at risk of taking
himself for another, something that belongs to the essence of an experience of election; as
if the least could do the most, but also as if (you will have noted, no doubt, that I often
have  recourse  to  the  “as  if,”  and  I  do  so  intentionally,  without  playing,  without  being  
facile, because I believe that a certain perhaps of the as if, the poetical or the literary, in
sum, lies at the heart of what I want to entrust to you) – as if the one who disavowed the
most, and who appeared to betray the dogmas of belonging, be it a belonging to the
community, the religion, even to the people, the nation and the state, and so on – as if this
individual alone represented the last demand, the hyperbolic request of the very thing he
appears to betray by perjuring himself. (Derrida 2007b, 13)
As this passage illuminates quite directly, it is the aporia/antinomy of experience itself, that is, of
those laws which structure it which Kant had tried to make peace with by first suggesting the
absolutely  essential  nature  of  the  ‘as  if’,  that  Derrida  finds  emblematically  demonstrated  within  
the  historical  ‘heritage’  of  religious  experience,  even,  and  especially,  his  own  religious
experience as a J/jew (Derrida 1999a). Yet,  it  seemingly  is  also  an  ‘as  if’  which  goes  beyond  the  
religious representations that litter our world. There is a core beyond it that yet comes from
within it, a ‘…perhaps of the as if’ that opens him up to ‘the poetical or the literary, in sum,
[what] lies at the heart of what I want to entrust to you’. In many ways, this religious
reconsideration in his work is merely an outgrowth of his earlier critique of the metaphysics of
presence he discerned to be at  work  in  Husserl’s  phenomenology,  thus  bringing  into  sharp  relief  
any  attempt  to  present  the  phenomena  itself,  ‘as  such’,  and  any  poetic/religious  attempt  to  do  
likewise (Derrida 1973; 1974; Hobson 2004). Derrida thus seems to place himself midway
between a phenomenological approach and a Kantian regulative principle, or as a ceaseless
oscillation  between  the  two  wherein  one’s  heritage(s),  even  a religious one, appears as relevant to
staking  one’s  identity  claims.
His own Judaic roots, of course, were not something he hid from public view; indeed, he
confesses  a  certain  pride  in  his  ‘jewishness’.    Yet,  there  was  also  a  proximate distance which he
took with regard to its practices, its public pronouncements, with the manner in which it makes it
mark upon those who profess it as a ‘living  faith’  in  some  sense. Hence, he is able to suggest that
it is a
‘…law  that  comes  upon  me,  a  law  that,  appearing  antinomian,  dictated  to  me,  in  a  
precocious and obscure fashion, in a kind of light whose rays are unbending, the hyper-
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formalized formula of a destiny devoted to the secret – and that is why I play seriously,
more and more, with the figure of the marrano: the less you show yourself as jewish, the
more  and  better  jew  you  will  be’. (Derrida 2007b, 13)
And perhaps  this  is  to  live  ‘as  if’  he  were  not  jewish  in  order  to  become  more jewish, though, of
course, leaving wide open the question of whether there could even be a jew in the first place, of
whether one could be said to exist at all. And this comment might serve to explain why he
considered  himself  to  be  ‘the last to deserve the title of authentic Jew’.    
For Derrida, it would seem, simply respecting the demands of the other before us (their
‘hyperbolic,  excessive’  demand),  in  fact  truly  being  hospitable  to  all others, is only possible
through  this  renunciation  of  a  ‘certain  dogmatism  of  the  place  or  of  the  bond  (communal,  
national,  religious,  of  the  state)’ (13). Only thus are we opened up toward a responsibility
‘without  limits’,  then,  which is itself illuminated against the messianic horizon of justice. This
would be an eschatology forever severed  from  any  teleology.    In  this  sense,  living  ‘as  if’  he  were  
not jewish would certainly seem to be a most faithful approximation to the Abrahamic core of
Judaism. It would also, perhaps, bear a certain affinity with those readings of Paul and the nature
of  the  ‘as  not’  which  seemed  to  condition  his  decisions  to  live  as  a  Jew  to  the  Jew  and  as  a  
Gentile  to  the  Gentile,  ‘as  if’  he  were  both,  or  neither (cf. Agamben 2005, 35ff).
The  conditional  nature  of  the  ‘as  if’  finds  firmer  roots  here  in  Derrida’s  work  than  it  did  
within the Kantian system, it would seem, firmer because more open to its own conditionality,
less likely to fall victim to an onto-theological  ‘metaphysics  of  presence’  which  would  otherwise  
seek to conceal its own violence, or wrongly attempt to posit something like the existence of God,
a proposition which Derrida would never have touched as such. This would seemingly be
something of the Heideggerian influence  within  Derrida’s  work,  a  movement  away  from  the  
ontotheological  heritage  of  providing  justifications  for  God’s  existence  in  order  to  ‘seal  the  gaps’  
within the cracks of all representations. Such a position is what at one point caused him to look
for the renvois (of traces) between representation and presentation which refused to be gathered
(or unified) under either heading. Unity, traditionally was a religious task, and it has been
religion which has most effectively dealt with the complex processes of providing intelligible
representations by which humanity can identify itself in relation to its animality, sexuality, race
and divinity (Derrida 2008; 2009). But this unity, of course, cannot be maintained by in the face
of the structural reality of différance, which also refuses to be present (Derrida 1982).
Historically speaking, however, religious tradition is nearly all we have before us, and is
therefore what should most concretely concern Derrida if the claims of representation are to be
taken seriously and are not subsequently dismissed.    It  is  only  within  such  ‘heritages’,  as  he  will  
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call  them,  that  representation  can  be  seen  to  work  (and  ‘un-work’)  itself, that is, wherein
différance can be said to function. It is, again, between the Jew and the Greek that all of history
is negotiated. Here, in the context of his struggles with the conditional and its relation to
religious belief, the  ‘as  if’  continues  to  find  its  stride  as  ‘…the  oscillation  and  the  undecidability  
continue, and I would dare say, must continue to mark the obscure and uncertain experience of
heritage. In any case, I have been unable to put a stop to this experience in me, and it has
conditioned the decisions and the responsibilities that have imprinted themselves upon my life’
(Derrida 2007b, 33). Hence, the contradictory positions which his work seemingly must endorse:
‘the  condition  that  one  emancipate  oneself  from  every  dogma  of  revelation  and  election’  or  see
this  emancipation  as  ‘the  very  content  of  the  revelation  or  of  the  election,  their  very  idea’, a
ceaseless alternation between presentation and representation that cannot ever be unified or
resolved (33). Indeed, the continuance of an uncertain experience of heritage has given rise to the
‘formalization’,  or  ‘most irreducible  logic’  of  the  discourses  which  run  throughout  his  work,  from  
a  ‘messianicity  without  messianism’  to  the  subject  of  writing  and  the  trace,  from  the  focus  on  a  
democracy always yet to come to the subject of khōra,  or  that  which  grounds  any  ‘event of
anthropo-theological  revelation’ (33).
What  is  really  being  posited,  according  to  the  logic  of  the  ‘as  if’  at  work  in  Derrida’s  
thought, is a tendency toward forming a core universal principle uncovered within the Judaic
religious heritage, one that signals something of the deconstructive method already at work
therein. The realization of this tension would insist upon, not only the necessary polarization of
our  world  into  ‘Jew’  and  ‘Greek’,  it  would  seem,  but  also  into  a  messianicity  over  against  an  
historical  messianism,  thus  also  a  ‘jewishness’  over  against  a  ‘judaism’.    It is, in so many words,
the  recognition  of  the  other  ‘outside  us’  as  the  other  ‘already within us’ as well. Hence, he can
word the aporia of how identity is represented as such:
Either these minimal features are universal and there is no reason to make them into what
is proper to the Jew, save to speculate again on the worrying logic of exemplarity; or, as
universal as they are, they will have been announced in a unique and precisely exemplary
fashion, by election, in a historical revelation; they would then have to do with writing,
with memory or with hope in what one calls judaism. (32)
At  any  rate,  a  sense  of  ‘jewishness’  is  inseparable  from  a  ‘judaism’,  he  will  tell  us,  because the
former can always root itself in the latter. Judaism  remains  then  as  a  ‘guardian  of  jewishness’,  an  
aid to its survival, but not necessarily as necessary. There is then, perhaps, another way to view
the  essence  of  ‘jewishness’  which  is  apparently  not entirely indebted to its Judaic roots. This
would  be,  in  no  uncertain  terms,  to  view  ‘jewishness’  as  it  is  in  itself,  as such, and without its
Judaic affiliation,  that  is,  to  reconsider  Judaic  exemplarity  through  a  Derrida’s  reframing  of  the  
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universal/particular divide (Hollander 2006). The shift he is making, and it is a most significant
one at that, is one  that  repeats  the  movement  from  transcendental  idealism’s  regulative  ‘as  if’  to  
the  phenomenological  ‘as  such’ without actually settling permanently on one or the other, resting
rather precariously between both.
In an interview given in  1995,  Derrida  commented  on  the  imagined  notion  of  acting  ‘as  if  
you  were  dead’,  an  act,  he  says,  which  allows  us  to  see  objects  as  they  truly  are  without  us,  as
such (Derrida 1996). And perhaps this holds the key to understanding, not only the manner in
which to perceive things as they are, but also to allow things to evolve over time into other forms
seemingly devoid of their historical rooting; that is, to achieve an approximation of universality
without  its  empirical,  historical  grounding.    Perhaps  there  is  an  ‘as  suchness’  beyond  the  
traditional  representations  of  things,  an  ‘as  suchness’  that  allows  things  to  exceed  their  
representations otherwise bound to the structures  of  the  ‘as  if’  though  only  accessible  through  
another  ‘as  if’—the  suspension  (bracketing)  of  the  subject,  ‘as  if’  it  were  dead.    This  viewpoint  
brings with it the possibility of change and justice within the horizon of a future always yet to
come.7
There  is  an  ‘Abrahamic’  core  to  the  three  monotheisms  of  the  west,  according  to  Derrida,  
which  ‘affects  this  tradition  in  an  unpredictable  way’ (Sherwood and Hart 2005, 33). Christianity
may  be,  in  his  opinion,  the  most  ‘plastic,  the  most  open’  religion, but it does not have a monopoly
on  (or  ‘greater  affinity  with’)  the  deconstructive  project.    In  effect,  it  would  seem  that  Derrida’s  
faith ultimately has a movement beyond historical religious projects in mind. What he appears to
be suggesting at times is the embracing of an emancipation from religious traditions, one that
places more stock in a (Kantian-inspired) conditional, poetic core of human experience than in
the heritage bequeathed to him and to so many others. The element to be universalized within
religious experience is the poetic core of faith (the  ‘as  such’), a core that exceeds every historical
representation (the  ‘as  if’)  and yet is inseparable from them,  because  to  be  glimpsed  ‘as  such’  
requires  that  one  be  bracketed  ‘as  if’  they  were  dead. Only in this way, Derrida suggests, can the
‘poetical’  and  ‘literary’  inheritance  he  intends  for  us  be  received.
Conclusion
Derrida’s  occasional  reflections  upon  the  processes  of  mourning  seem  to  resonate  deeply  
with his remarks on religion in a certain sense. Just as one cannot fully incorporate the lost object
being  mourned,  always  rather  being  suspended  between  a  more  or  less  ‘successful’  and  a  more  or  
less  ‘failed’  incorporation  of  the  beloved,  so  too  does  Derrida’s  Judaism  seem  to  be (Derrida
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1989, 33ff). It becomes, in this precise sense, that which he cannot fully appropriate, or take up
in name, if he is to be responsible to it (160). It is as if Derrida had penned another book, one
through which he was able to mourn  the  death  of  his  many  ‘Judeities’,  much  as  he  was  able  to  
mourn the loss of so many others throughout his lifetime (cf. Derrida 2003).
As almost a direct counterfoil to the many deaths which Derrida often found himself
mourning, there creeps up in his work another theme, one immersed in life and which seemingly
propels  humanity  forward  into  its  own  present.    Poetry,  for  him,  captures  something  of  the  ‘life  of  
language’  that  is  intertwined  with  the  ‘work  of  mourning’  that  Derrida  sees  as  central  to  
formulating  a  ‘hauntology’  as  it were (Derrida 2005, 103; cf. Derrida 2006).    If  the  ‘endless  
desertification  of  language’  which  signals  a  ‘rage  against  language’  is  what  Derrida  associates  
with  the  impossibility  of  saying  God’s  name,  as  he  suggests  elsewhere,  then  perhaps  it  is  poetry  
which seems to re-affirm the existence of the self amidst this profane horizon (Derrida 1995a,
55ff). This affinity which runs throughout the poetic enterprise can be glimpsed in the context of
his discussion of the poetry of Paul Celan, for example, where Derrida takes the occasion to
reflect upon the manner in which poetry itself attempts to confirm the present moment, to provide
a sense of contemporaneousness that in fact comes to rearticulate the precarious and strange
placement of the human being at the boundary between the human and the animal (Derrida 2005,
120ff).    It  is  a  present/presence  that  poetry  discloses  that  is  the  impossible  ‘I’,  a  gesture  that  says  
‘this  is  my  body’,  or  ‘in  memory  of  me’,  within  each  poem (Derrida 2005, 169). Poetry somehow
enables us to step outside of our human selves, to see the strange within us and to articulate, in
words or through the act of writing, the conditional nature of the beings that we are, to present the
‘as  suchness’  of  life,  or  the  ‘thing  itself’  as  it  were. This is the poetic heritage that Derrida seems
to seize upon as the fundamental gesture of constructing the human being through its expression
of our experience, and it seems directly to have picked up where religion, with its representations
indebted  to  the  ‘as  if’, left off.
Derrida’s  fidelity  is  therefore  not  necessarily  to  his  Judaic  roots  per  se,  but  to  the  
jewishness  that  pervades  every  act  of  reciting  the  ‘mourner’s  Kaddish’,  or  the  gesture  which  
confronts the impossibility of authentically incorporating the losses we have suffered in this life.
This  jewishness  is  the  ‘as  suchness’  of  the  believer  beyond  the  ‘as  if-ness’  of  judaism.    The
fragile  sense  of  self,  the  ‘I’  formed  in  such  a  way as to be apart from and yet indebted to the
conditional representations before us, is what is thereby created in the poetic gesture to affirm the
existence  of  the  self  despite  the  apparent  ‘falsity’  of  its  representations.    It  is  an  act  that  stands  
along with Cadmus and proclaims fidelity to that which cannot be proven to exist, but rather than
this being about God, it is about the self, and how it can be embraced though not certainly

15

defined, an act of re-presentation (or ‘iterability’) as it were. Though the human being may not
be able to fully, finally articulate its place within the animal kingdom, or in relation to the divine,
it can, however, strive to find itself within its own present, ‘as  such’,  as a being with experiences
that can be expressed and re-presented to itself, for itself, always striving to be more just in their
approximation of what it means to be a  being  ‘as  such’. It is this universal, poetic core of our
‘being-human’  that  Derrida  finds  circumscribing  (‘circumcising’)  the  essences  of  how  we  identify  
ourselves (‘as  such’)  over and beyond what  has  come  to  identify  us  (‘as  if’), and which was,
according to him, all he ever really wrote about (Derrida 1999a, 70).
Perhaps,  in  the  end,  this  would  not  place  him  as  far  from  Kearney’s  work  as  Kearney  
himself seems to indicate. Rather, the establishment  of  a  representative  narrative  ‘for  itself’  
would  seem  to  be  part  of  Derrida’s  project  as  well,  though  one  that  is  necessarily  interrupted  by  
the  presence  of  an  ‘other’  that  cannot  ever  be  brought  under  this  narrative  structure.    This is to
say, it is the invention of the other at work in our identities that exceeds the realm of
representations that are otherwise ‘for  us’  or  ‘for  themselves’ (Derrida 2007a). It is truly an
‘invention  of  the  other’  that  grounds  any  ‘invention’  of  the  self,  a  religious statement or a
declaration of mourning as much as anything else.
I am given over at the end of these reflections, and perhaps appropriately, to Pamela
Gillilan’s  reflections upon the death of her husband given in a collection of poems on the effects
of mourning, and which end with a poem that seemingly invokes an imperative that Derrida
would seem to have shared in:  ‘Write’ (Gillilan 1994, 104). As she works it through, writing is
an act wherein something powerful is discovered in the process, though it is something ‘never  
rich or full enough.’    Like  Euripides’  attempt  to  bring  chaos  within  order  through  the  performance  
of his art, here, the work of mourning is both celebration and sorrow, an interminable mixture of
each with no perfect balance ever really being struck. Hence, she is herself given over to
embrace the paradox (aporia) of her own work of mourning, the poetic experience which she only
took up constructing in response to her  husband’s  death.    There  are  no  words,  and  yet  words,  
along with their implicit limitations, move her along this path of grieving where the extremities of
language are so removed from our experience.
I  believe  that  Gillilan’s  poem  here circulates around the  richness  of  Derrida’s  work,
especially in his attempt to unite the  conditional  nature  of  all  experience  (it’s  essential  ‘as  if’  
quality) to the poetic gesture toward the present moment that is rooted deep within the Judaic (or
Abrahamic) tradition,  the  ‘as  suchness’  beyond  the  ‘as  if’  and  yet  rooted  in  it  in  some  sense.
Even  Gillilan,  for  her  part,  seems  to  acknowledge  the  fundamental  positioning  of  the  ‘as  if’  as  it  
relates to the mourned presence of one who is now forever lost, but also forever part of what we
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consider as  the  ‘I’  of  our  experiences,  present perhaps most emphatically as we strive to do more
justice to the memories that refuse to be compromised. As Gillilan describes it, she remembers
the  intimacy  of  her  husband’s  flesh,  remembers  its  ‘ignition’  and  its  ‘comfort’.    She  remembers  it  
in  fact  ‘as if the loss were new’,  but how does  one  ‘make  that  ring  true?’, she ponders. How
indeed,  we  might  add,  would  one  begin  to  live  ‘as  if’  they  knew  an intimacy forever beyond our
ability to represent it (as in cases involving death) and yet found themselves living in a flesh, with
its age and its sorrow, that is, at times, simply all too present?
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1. Cf. the Seaford translation (1996, 85). My thanks to Clifton Kreps for his assistance with regard to this
passage.
2.  As  Kearney  renders  it,  ‘Unlike  Benjamin  and  Levinas,  therefore,  Derrida’s  approach  to  the  messianic  
hovers in the antechamber of messianism. He explores rather than embraces the anatheist option. His
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saving  the  Name  does  not  entail  a  return  to  the  Named.    At  best,  it  is  an  “endless  waiting  in  the  desert.”    A  
waiting for  Godot  who  never  comes’  (65).
3.  Cf.  among  others,  some  exemplary  uses  of  the  ‘as  if’  in  Derrida’s  work,  including  ‘Before  the  Law’  in  
Derrida 2002;;  ‘A  Silkworm  of  One’s  Own’,  Derrida 2002, 314, 383, 251; Derrida 1995b, 72–3; Derrida
1997, 121, 149, 152.
4. This is not to suggest, however, that the singularities of what claimed him were unimportant, or
unessential, rather  that  Derrida  more  often  chose  to  focus  on  the  ‘impossible  property’  of  any  particularity,  
which is to say, as it approximates the universal concept he was dealing with, as, for example, in his
alternation between his indebtedness to the French language and the structure of language itself. Cf.
Derrida 1998, 63ff.
5. Cf. his references to the history of representation and its Platonic legacy in Derrida 2007a, 94–128.
6. Cf. the recurring polarity (general/restricted, economic/aneconomic) within which all concepts are
formed  in  Derrida’s  work.    Jacques  Derrida,  ‘From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without
Reserve’ (Derrida 1978, 251–277). See also Hurst 2008, 75.
7.  The  ‘suchness’  of  things  which  Derrida  points  toward  is  taken  up  perhaps no where more boldly than in
the work of Italian theorist Giorgio Agamben whose entire oeuvre, I would suggest, is directed toward the
presentation (not representation) of a thing such as it is, or as such. Intending to more fully flush out the
‘whatever’  nature  of  each  thing  over  and  against  its  limited  representations,  Agamben  rather  seeks  to  allow  
a  thing’s  exposure  to  take  place,  to  be  in  fact  the  taking  place  of  every  thing.    There  henceforth  develops  a  
general overlap between his comments on the presentation of a thing as such and the nature of paradigms
which, according to him, strive to elevate this principle of respect for the singularity of an example above
the dichotomous logic of division into particulars (a thing completely presented in its suchness) and
universals (a thing reduced to its representation). A paradigm, rather, moves only from particulars to
particulars, and thereby presenting the singularity of each thing instead of fostering its reductionistic
representations. Far from being coincidental to the scope of this essay, Agamben concludes his discussion
of  paradigms  with  a  description  of  a  thing’s  suchness  as  exemplified through a poem by Wallace Stevens
(‘Description  Without  Place’, Stevens 1997, 296). Cf. Agamben 2009, 32.
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